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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J.LUIES C.

K~IGHT

and

BE~\TRICE

M.

Kl~IGHT,
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vs.
l~T..:UI

PCfWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
corporation and OGDE..\ RIVER WATER
lTSER.S ASSOCld_TIOX, a corporation,

Defendants and Appella!nts.
'

Brief of Appellants

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be designated as they were in the Court below, where respondents
were the plaintiffs and appellants were defendants.
Plaintiffs, ,,-ho are husband and wife, brought this
action against the defendants to recover One Thousand
Eight Hundred Twenty Five ($1,825.00) Dollars damages claimed to have been sustained by them by reason of
the flooding of their premises, which flooding allegedly
resulted from defendant~· negligence. The case \Yas
tried before the Court and jury on N oYember :20th, 21st,
25th and 26th, 1947, in the District Court for Weber
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County, the Honorable Charles G. Cowley presiding.
At the opening of the trial, counsel for plaintiffs made
an opening statement of plaintiffs' case (Tr. 3-4), following which defendants separately moved for judgment
of non-suit (Tr. 5), which motions the court denied (Tr.
5). Upon the conclusion of plain tiffs' case in chief,
defendants separately moved for judgement of non-suit
(Tr. 132-134), which motions the court denied (Tr. 134).
After both sides had rested the defendants separately
moved for a directed verdict "No cause for action", (Tr.
257-259·), which motions the court denied (Tr. 260).
Thereupon the cause was submitted to the court under
instructions ~by the court, and the jury in due course returned its verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants for the amount of One Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Eight and 75/100 ($1,258.75) Dollars (Tr.
289). The verdict was by six of .the eight jurors, .two
jurors dissenting therefrom (Tr. 289). Thereafter, and
within the time allowed by law, the defendants each
moved the ·court for a new trial, which motion was on
December 8, 1947, denied. The defendants thereupon
;filed on February 19, 1948, their notice of appeal from
the judgement entered on the verdict, and from the order
denying their motions for new trial. The statutory undertaking on appeal was waived by plaintiffs.
Hereafter, where it becomes necessary to refer to a
defendant separately, defendant Utah Power and Light
Company will, for ·convenience, be referred to as the
Power Company, and defendant Ogden River Water
Users Association, as the Water Users.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rrHE PLEADINGS
Plaintiff~'

action \Ya~ based on the following complaint, as amended (omitting· title, signatures and verification);
·" Uome
defendant~

the plaintiffs and complain of the
and for cause of action allege:
UO\\'

The defendant Utah Power & Light
Company is and at all times herein mentioned was
a corporation duly orga11ized and existing under
the la\YS of the State of Maine and duly licensed
to do busines~ within the State of Utah. The defendant Og·den River Water Users Association is
and at all times herein mentioned was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the State of Utah.
""1.

At all times herein mentioned the plaintiffs were the owners of the following described
real property situated in Weber County, State of
Utah:
'' 2.

'All of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, Block 12, The
Hermitage of Ogden Canyon, situate in the Northeast qu~rter of the Southeast quarter of Section
18, Township 6 North, Range 1 East Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey.'
The said real property was at all times herein
mentioned improved with a frame dwelling with
six rooms and a bath having hardwood floors and
knotty pine finish, together with a cesspool sewer
system constructed in said lands for the use of the
said house. The ~aid dwellip_g- house was completely furnished, at all times herein mentioned
\vith customa1·y household furnishings, furniture
and fixtur~~ incl udiug a console radio and at the
time of the flooding of the ~aid premises as here3
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inafter alleged the plaintiffs owned and had
stored therein large quantities of clothing, luggage and other personal property.
'' 3. At the time of the flooding of the said
premises the said household furniture, furnishings and equipment aforesaid, which were all
property of the plaintiffs, were of the reasonable
value of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars and
upwards. The said dwelling house was of the
reasonable value of Five Thousand ( $5,000.00)
Dollars and upwards, and the clothing, luggage
and household supplies aforesaid were of the
value of One Thousand ($1,000.00 Dollars and
upwards.
'' 4. At all times herein mentioned a large
wooden water pipe or flume was laid on the N ortb
side of Ogden Canyon in said Weber County on
a point near the head of said Ogden Canyon past
the premises of the plaintiffs aforesaid through
the mouth of Og·den Canyon. The said pipe or
flume was then and there owned, controlled and
maintained by the defendants jointly and the said
defendants were at all times herein mentioned
under contractual obligations with each other and
with the United States of America to be jointly
responsible for the care and maintenance of said
pipe. The said pipe was originally constructed
and laid by the defendants and the United States
Government as a joint enterprise for the use and
benefit of the defendants.
'' 5~ The defendants at all times herein mentioned used the said water pipe to conduct water
u:nder great pressure and at g~reat velocity for the
purposes of the defendants from the head of
Ogden Canyon to the mouth thereof. In the construction and in the maintenance of the said water
4
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pipl~

and in the use thL_\reof in violation of the duty
\Yhieh the defendant8 and eaeh of them owed to
all property O\Yuers in said Ogden Canyon and
particularly to the plaintiffs, the defendants careh)ssly and neg·ligent ty eonstructed and maintained
the said pipe by en relessly and negligently failing
to protect the same from larg·e stones and boulders
\Yhich during the spring of each year roll down
the steep mountainsides of said Ogden Canyon
and across the place \Yhere the said pipe wa.s and
is constructed and maintained, but on the contrary
the said defendants carelessly and negligently left
the said pipe lying unprotected upon the surafce
of the gTound in the places where the said boulders roll down said mountainsides, and carelessly
and negligently coursed large quantities of water
under pressure into and through said pipe so
left unprotected. . The defendants and each of
them \Yell knew, or by the exercise of reasonable
care could have known that in the spring of every
year rocks being loosened on the melting of the
frost roll down the sides of said moutains and
across the place where the parties laid and maintained said pipe vvithout protecting the same from
said rocks and boulders.
·
"6. On or about the 28th day of February,
1946, during a spring thaw large rocks and boulders became loosened from the moutainside of said
Ogden Canyon and rolled down said mountainside with gTeat force and violence and rolled into
and upon the said waterpipe so left negligently
exposed by the defendants and crushed and broke
the said waterpipe so that very large quantities
of "~a ter were released therefrom under great
force and at high velocity and flowed from said
pipe across the ground and upon and across the
premises of the plaintiffs through the house \vith

5
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which said.· prernises were and are improved completely soaking and saturating the s~d frame
building and all of its contents and leav1ng heavy
deposits of mud and silt therein and filling up
the cesspool of the parties, completely destroying luggage of the parties of the value of One
Hundred ( $100.00) Dollars, completely destroying a French bouvai rug of the value of One
Hundred ( $100.00) Dollars, completely destroying clothing of the parties of the value of Three
Hundred Seventy Five ($375.00) Dollars and
household linens of the parties of the value of
Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars, and groceries of the value
of Ten. ( $10.00) Dollars. Plaintiffs were further
compelled to expend and they did. expend the sum
of Three Hundred ($300.00). Dollars for removing the said mud and silt from their said dwelling
house and cleaning the same and cleaning and
polishing the said furniture and cleaning drift
and debris from the yard deposited therein by
said waters and cleaning the garage of the parties
situated on said premises and redigging and repairing the said cesspool and repairing doors and
furniture damaged by water and cleaning and
repairing the said fireplace in the said dwelling.
The parties were further compelled. to expend and
did expend the sum of Tvvo Hundred Twenty Five
($~25.00) Dollars in and about the repair and
replacement of hardwood flooring ruined and
damaged by said waters and mud and silt and
the further sum of Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars in and
about the cleaning and repair of clothing of the
parties which they were able to salvage from the
flood caused by the negligence of the defendants
as aforesaid. The said premises and the dewlling house thereon have further been damaged beyond repair in the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00)
6
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Dollar~,

and the furniture of the plaintiffs has
been damaged beyond repair in the sum of One
Hundred rr"·enty Five ($125.00) Dollars all to
the damag·e of the plaintiffs in the sum of One
Thou~and Eig·ht Hundred and Twenty Five
( $1,8~5.00) Dollars.
'' "\\. .H~REFORE, plaintiffs pray judg·ment
against the defendants and each of them in the
~urn of One Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty
Five ( $1,825.00) Dollars, for cost of suit and for
such other and further relief as to the court may
seem meet. ' '

Defendant Power Company demurred generally and
specially to such complaint as follows (omitting title
and signatures) :
·'Comes no\Y the defendant, Utah Power &
Light Company, and demurs to the complaint of
the plaintiffs on file herein and for cause thereof
alleges:
'' ( 1) That said complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute the cause of action attempted to be pleaded in said complaint, or any
cause of action against this demurring .defendant.
"(2) (a) That said complaint and particularly paragraph 2 thereof is uncertain in this,
that it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether
the improvements upon the said real property
claimed to be owned by the plaintiffs were constructed to or subsequent to the construction of the
water pipe referred to in paragraph 4 of said
complaint.
1~

''(b) That said paragraph of said complaint
ambiguous for the foregoing reasons.
7
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'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint
is unintelligible for the foregoing reason~.
" ( 3) That said complaint and particularly
paragraph 4 thereof is
" (a) uneertain in this, that it cannot be
ascertained therefrom whether the said pipe referred to therein was constructed prior or subsequent to the improvements upon the land
claimed to be owned by the plaintiffs, as set out
in paragraph 2 of said complaint, nor can it be
ascertained therefrom by whom said pipe) was
constructed, whether by this demurring defendant or by the United States of America or by
whom, nor can it be ascertained therefrom what
contractual obligations it is claimed there were
bet,veen the parties mentioned in said paragraph
of said complaint, nor can it be ascertained therefrom when it is claimed that the said pipe was
o'vned, controlled or maintained by the said defendants jointly, nor can it it ascertained therefrom why it is claimed that this demurring defendant was jointly responsible with the other
persons named in said paragraph or any of them,
for the care and maintenance of said pipe.
'' (b) That said paragraph of said complaint
is ambiguous for the foregoing reasons.
'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint
is unintelligible for the foregoing reasons.
'' ( 4) That paragraph 5 of said complaint
is uncertain in this
" (a) That it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether the plaintiffs claim that this demurring defendant was negligent in the construction of said pipe or whether it is claimed
8
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by ~aid eomplaint that this demurring defendant
\\~as

negligent in the maintenance thereof, nor
can it be ascertained therefrom why such constrnetion or maintenance was in violation of any
duty to the plaintiffs, nor can it be ascertained
therefrom 'Yhy this demurring· defendant was
negligent in failing to protect said pipe from
stones or boulders rolling down the mountain
side, as set out in said complaint, nor can it
be ascertained therefrom how or why it is claimed
that this demurring defendant 'vas guilty of any
carelessness or neg-ligence in leaving said pipe
unprotected upon the surface of the ground, nor
can it be ascertained therefrom why it is claimed
this demurring defendant could have known that
in the spring of eYery year, or at any time, rocks
\\'"ould be loosened by the melting of frost or otherwise and roll down the side of the mountain and
across the place where said pipe line was maintained, nor why or for what reason this demurring
defendant 'vas under any duty to prot·ect the said
pipeline from any rocks or boulders.
''(b) That said paragTaph of said complaint
is ambiguous for the foregoing reasons.
'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint
is unintelligible for the foregoing reasons.
'' ( 5) That said complaint and particularly
paragraph 6 thereof is uncertain in this :
'' (a) That it cannot be ascertained therefrom
ho\\r or \vhy it is claimed that there was any negligence upon the part of this demurring defendant
in leaving said pipeline exposed, as therein set
out, nor can it be ascertained therefrom whether
it is claimed by the plaintiffs that said pipeline
was constructed prior or subsequent to the said

9
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impro-vements upon said property claimed to be
owned by the plaintiffs, or whether said personal
property therein described ,vas placed therein
prior or subsequent to the construction of said
pipeline, nor can it be ascertained therefrom when
it is claimed that said pipeline was constructed.''
A similar demurrer was filed by defendant Water
Users.
The demurrers were overruled, whereupon defendants separately answered, putting in issue the question
of its negligence and plaintiffs' damage, and further
affirmatively pleaded that the pipeline which became
broken, allowing water to flow on to plaintiffs' premises, was constructed by the United States in the years
1935 and 1936 under contract with Barnard Curtis Company, and under plans and specifications prepared by
the United States and in accordance with best approved
engineering practices, and along the only practical and
feasible route therefor, and that the pipe line at all times
remained and was maintained in the same condition as
originally constructd and installed; further that plaintiffs' acquired the premises that were damaged subsequent to the building of the pipeline and subsequent
to April 5, 1944, well knowing of the existence and location of the pipeline and the manner in which it was installed; further, that the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage, if any, was not any act of omission or commission
of the defendants, but was the act of the State Highway
Commission in banking snow on either side of the highway and thus channelling water flowing from the break
down the highway onto plaintiffs' premises, instead of

10
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flo"·ing into the riYer a~ it otherwise naturally would
have done; further, that plaintiffs' action was barred
by the provi8ion8 of section 104-2-30, Utah Code Annotated, 19±3.
THE FACTS
()n ~fay

:28, 1935, the United States entered into a
contract ""ith Barnard-Curtiss Company under which the
latter \Yas to construct a conduit, or wood stave pipeline
from Pineview Dam in upper Ogden Canyon down the
canyon to the mouth thereof. The pipeline was 75 inches
in diameter and was for the purpose of conveying water
from the dam for electric power developments and for
irrigation of extensive acreages in Weber and Box Elder
counties. It runs in a generally easterly and westerly
direction. The line was constructed during the years
1935 and 1936, in accordance with plans and specifications prepared by the lTnited States, and along the route
selected by it. (Exhibit 6 and 7, Tr. 140, 141.) Subsequent to the building of the pipeline, plaintiffs acquired
a home in the canyon some distance below the Dam, and
fronting on the canyon highway. (Tr. 119). On the evening of February 28, 1946, a break occurred in the pipeline about three-fourths mile easterly (towards the dam)
of plaintiffs' home; the water flowed from the break
onto the highway, and then down the highway until it
reached plaintiffs' premises, where it flowed upon the
premises and into the home. Prior to this snow fall in
the canyon had been quite heavy, and in plowing the snow
therefrom the State Highway Commission had banked
it along each side of the highway and had it not been for
the sllo\Y so banked along either side of the highway the

11
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water would not have flown down the highway to plaintiffs' premises, but would have left the highway and
flown into Ogden River long before it reached plaintiffs'
premises. (Tr. 193-198; 205; 232. At the point where
the break in the pipeline occurred, the pipeline is located
about 50 feet north of the highway, and at an elevation
above the highway. In installing the pipeline at this
point a cut was made in the side of the canyon and
the pipe laid at the base of the cut (Tr. 212). The cut
is about 25 feet deep, and the face of the cut rises direetly above the north side of the pipe about 25 feet
(Tr. 212).. Above the cut to the north th·e canyon opens
out into a gradual slope until it reaches precipitous
cliffs some half mile farther north {Tr. 186-188). On
the evening of February 28, 1946, a large ma.ss of rock
hecam·e dislodged from these -cliffs some half mile to
the north of the canyon, and a large boulder came down
the slope in great leaps and hounds toward the pipeline.
As it approached the pipeline it struck the ground about
68 paces to the north of the cut, at the base of which
lay the pipeline, and then apparently leaped hig·h in the
air and descended a.t a point where it just cleared the
brow of the cut and struck the pipeline, tearing a hole
in it, from which flowed the water which reached plaintiffs' premises. (Tr. 180). Immediately following the
accident a large rock, weighing some 91j2 tons, was
found lying in the highway directly below the break
in the pipeline. ( Tr. 230, 241).
Following the construction of the pipeline by the
United States, the responsibility for its maintenance
had been turned over to the defendants.

12
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Plaintiffs' cause of action, as we understand it, is
predicated upon the theory that defendants were negligent in the ·construction of the pipeline, and in its maintenance, in that they should have forseen this danger
to the line and have taken precautions in addition to
'vhat they did, to guard against it. The court by its
Instruction No. 7, (Tr. 276) itself determined that there
\\TH~ no evidence in the ease of negligence in the matter
of maintenance, and purported to submit the case to the
jury solely upon the theory of negligence in its construction.
The evidence in further detail will be considered
in connection with Points I and II of the Argument.
STATE~IENT

OF ERRORS UPON WHICH

APPELLANTS RELY
1. The lo"\\ er court erred in overruling defendants'
demurrers.
7

. 2. The lower court erred in denying defendants'
motions f·or non-suit following plaintiffs' opening statement.
3. The lower court erred in denying defendants'
motions for non-suit following completion of plaintiffs'
case in chief.
4. The lower court erred in denying defendants'
motions for directed verdict.
5. The lower court erred in refusing to g·ive defend-

ants' Requested Instruction No. 1 ( Tr. 265).

13
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6. The lower court erred in refusing to give defendants' Requested Instruction No. 9. (Tr. 268).
7. The lower court erred in refusing to give defendants' Requested Instruction No. 14 (Tr. 269).

8. The lower court erred in giving Instruction No.
1 (Tr. 273-274).
9·. The lowercourt erred in g1v1ng that portion of
Instruction No. 1 reading a.s follows:
"The defendants and each of them well knew,
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that in the spring of every year rocks
being loosened on the melting of the frost roll
down the sides of said mountains and across the
place ''rhere the defendants laid and maintained
said pipe 'vithout protecting the same from said
rocks and boulders," ( Tr. 284-285).

10. The lo"\'\rer court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction No. 1 reading as follows:
''The defendants by their answers deny that
they were negligent in the construction and maintenance of said pipeline, and deny that there was
any negligence on their part directly or proximately causing any damages which the plaintiffs
may have suffered, and defendants pray that said
complaint be dismissed," (Tr. 285).
11. The lo,ver court erred in giving Instruction No.
o. (Tr. 275).

12. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Tustruction No. 5 reading as follows :

14

'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.. It is the efficient cause,-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury," ( Tr. 285).
13. The lo,Yer court erred in giving Instruction No.
)-(j· -:...t
)--)
t •
9. (T r. :,.,
14. The lo,ver court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 9 reading as follows
··\V-ater collected by g-ravitation manifests a
power familiar to all, capable of accomplishing
useful and beneficial purposes, or destructive
and disastrous consequences and results,'' ( Tr.
285).
15. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 9 reading as follows :
If the defendants in this action interfered
"-ith or undertook to control the force of the water
flowing down Ogden Canyon, for their own purposes, by the diversion of that water into a
wooden pipe constructed along the side of the
canyon and above the land, home and other property of the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Knig·ht, the
law requires the defendants so doing to use ordinary judgment, skill, care and caution in the construction and maintenance of that pipeline and in
the use of the pipeline for the coursing of water
in order that the property of the plaintiffs may
not be injured.'' ( Tr. 286).
4

'

16. The lowercourt erred in giving Instruction No.
10. (Tr. 277-278).
17. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 10 reading as follows:

15
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''If the defendants constructed the \vooden
pipeliue referred to in the evidence in this case or
conveyed waters through the same for their own
purposes, the defendants were under a duty to
use the same care which an ordinary prudent man
\vould use in the construction and operation of
the pipeline to prevent the escape of water from
the pipe to the damage of those in the vicinity.''
(Tr. 287).
18. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 10 reading as follows:
''The degree of care required to prevent the
escape of water is commensurate with the damage
or injury that will probably result if the water
does escape,'' ( Tr. 287.)
19. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 10 reading as follows:
''In this case if a reasonable prudent man
would anticipate that the damage 'vhich would
probably result if the water should escape from
the pipeline here involved would be high, then the
degree of care required to prevent the escape of
-vvater from this pipeline would he high." (Tr.
287).
20. The lower court erred in giving that portion
of Instruction 10 reading a.s follows :
''If you find from a preponderance of all of
the evidence in this case that the defendants, in
the construction of the pipeline in this case, failed
to exercise that degree of care to prevent the
escape of water from the pipeline which an ordinary prudent man in the same or similar circumstances would exercise in the protection of said
16
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pipeline from roeln; rolling do\Yll the eauyou hill~idt\ that eould reasonably be anticipated to roll
do\\'11 the canyon hillside, and that as the untural
~n1d proximate rP8nlt of their neglect to exercise
that care \Vater e~;eaped from the pipeline and
enu~ed dn1nage and injury to the property of the
plaintiffs, then yon ::-;hould find for the plaintiffs.'' (Tr. :287).
21. The lo\\'er eourt erred in giving Instruction No.
1:2. (Tr. 278-279).

:2:2. The lo,ver court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 1:2 reading· as follows :

·'Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for damage to their clothing, but
not to exceed the sum of $375, the amount claimed
by plaintiffs." (Tr. 279).
23. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 12 reading as follows:
"'Such sum as will reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable repair actually
needed of clothing of the parties which they were
able to salvage, but not to exceed the sum of $50,
the amount claimed by plaintiffs." (Tr. 279)
24. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 12 reading as follows :
''Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable expenditure
marle b~T them and "rhich was actually necessary
for removing the said mud and silt from their
<lw,elling housP and cleaning the same, and cleanillg· and polishing of said furniture, and cleaning
drift and debris from the ~Tard, and cleaning the
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garage, and re-digging and repairing the cesspool,
and repairing doors and furniture damaged by
water, and cleaning and repairing the fire place
in the said d'velling, but not to exceed the sum of
$300, the amount claimed by the plaintiffs." (Tr.
279).

25. The lower court erred in giving that portion of
Instruction 12 reading· as follows :
''Such sum as will reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable damage beyond
repair of the furniture, but not to exceed the sum
of $125, the amount claimed by plaintiffs.'' ( Tr.
279).

THE ARGUMENT
For the purposes of argument, and in the interests
of brevity, certain of the assigned errors will he grouped,
and considered collectively.

I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFEN·DANTS' DE~!URREtRS, IN DENYING DEFE~NDANTS' M·OTION FOR NON-SUIT FOLLOWING PLAINTIFFS' OPENING STATEMENT, AND
IN D.ENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NONSUIT FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE IN CHIEF. (ASSIGNED ERRORS 1,
2 and 3).

Plaintiffs' complaint as amended, and defendants'
demurrer thereto is set forth herein at pages 3 to 10.
Plaintiffs' opening statement to the jury is at pages 3
and 4 of the transcript. The allegations of defendants'
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llf~gl igt>uce. ~o

far a~ the complaint is concerned, are as
embodied in parag-raph 5 of the complaint. The expected
proof of such ueg·ligencP, a~ t:\videnced by plaintiffs'
opening 8ta.temeut, is ~ho,vn at page 4 of the transcript.

In substance sueh asserted negligence is that the
defendant's constructed the pipeline in such a manner
as to leave it above ground and exposed at the point
\\There the break actually occurred, Without protective
covering from rolling· rocks, knowing· that in the spring
of the year rocks become dislodged above the pipeline
from melting frosts, and roll toward and across it.
Plaintiffs' evidence was limited to a. showing that the
pipeline "\Yas above ground at points near where it was
broken on the evening of February 28, 1946, that in
the past small and larg·e rocks have been dislodged from
the canyon "\Yalls and rolled upon the highway, hut not
in this particular area, (Tr. 16-17), that no evidence of
rolling rocks at the place where this break occurred was
observed over a period of thirty-five years prior to
February 28, 1946, (Tr. 19), that near the place where
this break occurred a break occurred in another pipeline about t\venty-five years previous, (Tr. 26-31) but
the witness couldn't say what caused that earlier break
(Tr. 29), that a small 24 inch pipeline owned by Ogden
City, that was rotten and deteriorating, was damaged by
rolling rocks in the past (Tr. 32-36), that only one
previous break had occurred in the existing pipeline,
which is evidenced in this action, which break occurred
some year~ before, and in a different area (Tr. 40-41),
that this pipeline at the point of the break on February
28, 194-G, 'vas eovered '"'ith earth to a depth of six inches
(Tr. 42).
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It is defendants' contention that neither the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs' opening statement, or
plaintiffs' evidenee showed any actionable negligence
on the part of the defendants. '11 he most it shows is
that the pipe line was located so as to he in a position
to be struck by rolling rocks if uncovered, that it had
been struck and broken by a rock at least once before,
but in a different area, it had never been struck or broken
in this particular area before, and it was covered in this
particular area to a depth of at least six inches, which
obviously was sufficient to protect it from a rolling rock.
Defendants' position is that this case is governed by
the decision of this Court in the case of Logan, Hyde
P.ark & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
45 Utah 491, 146 P. 560. The facts in that case are similar to those in the instant case. There plaintiff was
the owner of an irrigation canal which, at the point of
the alleged injury, was constructed along the side of a
steep mountain. Defendant constructed a wooden flume
along the same mountain side about fifty feet above
plaintiff's canal.. Above the canal and flume, along the
mountainside were many boulders of various sizes, some
very large. There were also many loose rocks of various
sizes, some of which would, from time to time, become
loosened and roll down the mountainside. On 1lay 22,
1913, a large rock rolled down the mountainside, struck
and broke defendant's wooden flume, and water flowing
from the break therein damaged plaintiff's canal. The
rock started about 500 feet above defendant's flume.
Defendant's flume was six feet high, the upper four
feet being completely exposed. The flume was constructed as such flumes usually are in this state, along
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the incline or contour of the mountain, and it was sufficient for the purpo~e for \Vhich it was constructed.
While roekB of Yariou~ ~izes from time to time rolled
do"·n the mou11tai11, there \Va~ no evidence of previous
damage to the flume during the twelve years it had been
iu exi~tence .. r_rhere \Ya~ no evidenc.e that defendant did
anything to c.ause the rock to be placed where it was, or
to 8tart it rolling dow11 the mountain.

Upoll 8Uch evidence defendant moved for a non-suit,
which was denied. Defendant then produced evidence
showing it \vas in no \vay connected with the loosening of
th~ rock in question, and also produced evidence (the
nature of \vhich is not apparent from the opinion) from
which it was made to appear that some person who was
stranger to the defendant, c.aused the rock to roll. In
its decision this court said :
··The denial of the motion for a nonsuit is assigned as error, aJ?.d it is also insisted that the verdict is not supported by any evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant.
"It seems to us this contention is sound. True,
plaintiff's counsel contend that, in view that there
were many large boulders and loose rocks along
the steep incline on the mountain side above the
flume, it was the defendant'B duty to guard
against injury to its flume from any o£ the rocks
that might become dislodged and roll down the
mountain side. According to plaintiff's own evidence, however, such a danger or contingency was
quite remote. The evidence is conclusive that the
\rooden flume \\'as in operation for at least twelve
years before the rock in question struck and injured it. IB it negligence not to forsee and guard
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against the consequences of an occu1Tence of the
character in question here, -vvhich happens only
once in t-vvelve years, and may not occur again or
is it any evidence of negligence~ If such be the
law, then the only method by \vhic~ the defendant
can make itself immune against su1ts for dam.ages
caused by rocks that may roll down the mountain
side and which cause injury to its flume, and may
thus result in causing the \Vater flowing therein
to cause damages, is to remove all the rocks that
are along the mountain side above the flume, or
build the flume into the mountain side and cover
it over so that no rocks could possibly injure it.
The latter is what plaintiffs counsel sug·gest defendent should have done. To require that seems
quite unreasonable.
'' ·courisel for plaintiff have, however, cited
one case, namely H·owe v. West Seattle L. & I. Co.,
21 Wash. 594; 59 Pac. 495, which they claim supports their contention. In that case the defendant
placed a large log on the brink of a precipitous
inc'line, and after it had lain there for some time
a landslide occurred, which caused the log to roll
down the 1nountain side, and in its course it struck
and killed plaintiff's infant child. That case is not
point here, for the reason that the defendant in
that case placed and left the log in an unsafe and
dangerous place or position. That case falls within the principle laid down by us in the ease of
Furkovich v. Bingham, Etc., Co., 45 Utah 89; 143
Pac. 121. In that case it was the defendant that
set in n1otion the instrumentality which, in rolling
down the mountain side, eaused the injury to the
plaintiff there, while in the Howe case, supra, the
defendant left the instrumentality, the log, in such
an unsafe place or position that it was forced
down the mountain side by natural forces, which,
under the evidence and circumstances the~e shoV\rn,
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thl~ \\'"n~hiuglou court held the defendant should
haYl~ t\n·~el'll. No ~nell conditions are involved in

the

l'H~e

at bar .

.. The ea~e of :B-,lemiug Y. Rail \vay, 158 Pa. 130;
:2j .A.tl. ~~ L. 1~. A. 351; 38 Am. St. Rep. 835,
i~, hO\\·t·ver, ~qnarely in point in favor of the defendant. In that case, the· same as here, a rock,
from ~orne uukno\Yll cause, became dislodged and
rolled do\vn a bteep cliff, and in its course struck
a railroad train and killed a passenger w·hile
riding in a coach in said train. There, as here, the
defendant \Yas in no \Yay connected with the in~trumentality (the rock) which caused the injury,
and the court held that therefore it could not be
held liable, and reversed the judgment. That
case, in the ,,·riter 's judgment, \vas much stronger
in favor of the plaintiff there than this is the case
at bar in favor of the plaintiff here. "Te cannot
see ho\v this judgment can he sustained upon any
sound legal principle.''
That case, we submit, is conclusive as to this. Except
for one factor, the facts are identical. That one factor
makes defendants' position in this case stronger than
in the Logan, Hyde ~ark Case. In the Logan, Hyde
Park case at least four feet of the flume was exposed
to the danger of rolling rocks. In this case, as shown
by plaintiffs' testimony, the pipe line was completely
covered at the place of damage. (Tr. 42). In that case
it vvas the first break in twelve years; in ours, while
there had. been a previous break in another area some
t\\·o yPal·s previous, the only damage in this area \vas
t\\·euty-five years previous, and there \\'as no proof that
it haLl be('ll cause<.l by a rolling rock.
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In this case plaintiffs' claim, as evidenced by their
complaint, that defendants were negligent in not protecting the line from rolling rocks. r_rhe answer to that
is in the language of this court in the Logan case :
"If such he the law, then the only method by
which the defendant can make itself immune
against suits for damages caused by rocks that
may roll down the mountain side and \\~hich cause
injury to its flume, and may thus result in causing
the water flowing therein to cause damages, is
to remove all the rocks that are along the mountain side above the flume, or build the flume into
the mountain side and cover it over so that no
rocks could possibly injure it. The latter is \vhat
plaintiff's counsel suggest defendant should haYe
done. To require that seems quite unreasonable.''
The lower court conceded that decision was controlling in this case, except for one factor which it felt differentiated the two. That point of distinction, the lower
eourt held, was that defendant in the Logan case offered
evidenee that a stranger loosened the rock. We contend
that is not an important factor, first, because that came
in as part of defendant's case, and this court held that
defendant's motion for non-suit should have been granted; second, this court does not mention that factor as
being important to its decision; and, third, it can't have
any hearing upon the matter. To hold that it is the
determining factor, is to say that defendants' are obliged
to anticipate damage from acts of God (our case), but
not to anticipate damage from acts of humans. This, of
course, is not the law, as it is elementary that an injury
resulting directly and proximately from an act of God
is not recoverable. 43 C. J. 746. Hence, if it be con24
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eeded thn t it i~ not neg·ligence to construct a pipe line
or flume in this mountainou8 area along a mountain side,
eren though it i~ eJ.~posed to rocks as in the Logan case,
and thi8 court held in the Logan case that such was not
negligeuee, then \Yhether the rolling rocks are started
do\\·n\\·ard by humans or by an act of God is immaterial.
In other \vords, if these defendants would not be liable
if stranger~ had loosened the rock that caused the damage, a fortiori they are not liable when the rock is
loosened by an act of God.
The only claimed negligence, accordingly, being that
defendants constructed the pipeline without adequate
protection from rolling rocks, and this court having held
in the Logan case that such is not negligence in an area
where experience has shown that damage therefrom is
infrequent, and plaintiffs' own evidence having shown
that damage from rolling· rocks in this area was extremely infrequent, the lower court erred in overruling
defendants' demurrer, in denying defendants' motion
for non-suit on plaintiffs' opening statement, and in
denying defendants' motion for non-suit at the conclusion
of plaintiffs' case in chief.
A situation very similar to that involved in the
present case is found in the case of LeDeau v. Northern
Pac~fic Railroad Company (Idaho), 115 Pae. 503. In
that case a rock came leaping and bounding down the
side of a mountain and through the window of one of the
defendants' railway cars, striking and injuring a passenger. The Court there said:
"The only question for consideration is that
of neglig-ence. It is clear from this evidence that
ihe rock did not fall from the Bide of the cut. It
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\vas e\'iclentl v not an overhanging or loose rock
left on the fa.ee of the cut through which the track
\vas laid. The respondent seems to think that the
rock came from hig·h up on the mountain side, and
that theory is borne out by the testimony of
the other \vi tnesses, as well as by the surrounding
circumstances, and the actual falling· of the stone
and its striking the car at the height and place
'where it did strike. It must have come from a
considerable distance, in order to have g·ained sufficient momentum to drive it from the place where
it last struck the ground above the face of the cut,
and carry it through the ear window in the direction in which it was passing when it struck
respondent.
"It is clear, therefore, that the accident did not
occur by reason of anything which the appellant
or its agents or employes did, nor did it occur
through any defect in the appliances which appellant was using, or the instrumentalities it was
employing as a common carrier. The only theory
on which appellant could be held for the results
of this accident would be that it owed to respondent, and to all of its passengers, an active duty
to employ such means as were necessary and
sufficient to either clear the mountain side of
loose and overhanging rock and stone, or else to
construct along its right of way such retaining
walls or barriers as vYould be likely to prevent
rock and stone from rolling down the mountain
side onto its track. To require such an active
duty on the part of a railroad company operating
in this intermountain region, where roads are
necessarily built through canyons and arounrl
mountain sides, \vhere the bluffs and hills rise
prPcipitonsly for hnndrP< ls and sometimes thouBands of feet above, would be imposing upon the
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l·on1pa11.'{ a duty that "rould be burdensome, and

might sometiint:B prove prohibitive to transportation companie:s. The mere suggestion of building retaining \Vall:s along· railroad rights of way
through some of the canyons and ravines in this
mountainonB country, demonstrates its futility.
X o company could support such an expense.''
A eaBP to the same effeet is the case of Fleming vs. Pittsburg Rail\Yay Company (Penn.) 27 Atl. 858.

II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANTS' 1IOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER
ONE, WHICH WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE
JURY TO FIND FOR THE DEFE!NDANTS AND
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.
At the conclusion of all the evidence defendants
moved the lo\ver court for a directed verdict ( Tr. 257260), and upon its denial submitted its proposed Instruetion No. 1 directing the jury to find for the defendants
and against plaintiffs. This was refused. (Tr. 265).
Error is assigned.
Following completion of plaintiffs' evidence, the
substance of which, insofar as it related to defendants'
negligence, has heretofore been discussd, and following
defendants' motion for non-suit (which was denied),
defendants offereu evidence affirmatively showing their
freeuo1n from ueglig·ence.
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J. R. Iakisch, th eng·i11eer in charge of the construetion of this pipeline by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (and whose qualifications are unquestioned)
testified that the specifications for construction of the
pipeline (Defendants' Exhibit 7) were prepared by engineers of the Bureau of Reclamation, that they were
prepared in accordance with best approved engineering
practices, that the line was constructed in accordance
with the specifications (Tr. 141), and that due consideration was given to reasonably anticipated damage from
falling rocks (Tr. 143). On cross examination he testified that economic factors enter into the question of
completely burying a pipeline in a mountainside, and
in determining whether it is to be of wooden or steel
construction (Tr. 147-148). On redirect he testified that
this particular damag·e occurred in an area in which, in
his judgment, there was less reason to anticipate damages from falling or rolling rocks than any other area;
that the slope above the pipeline is gradual until cliffs
a long distance away are reached Tr. 148), and that
the cost of a complete tunnelling of the mountain for the
pipe line (Tr. 149) or complete elimination of all possible
hazards (Tr. 156) would have been prohibitive.
The witness J. W. Farrell, who resided at Huntsville,
at the top of Ogden Canyon, and who was a former employee of the defendants, testified that as he was on his
way home between 6 :30 and 7 :00 o'clock P. M. on the
evening of February 28, 1946, he met the water coming
down the highway from the break in the line at a point
about a thousand feet belo\v the break (Tr. 158), and half
a mile above plaintiffs' house (Tr. 168). He proceeded
through the water to the home of the pipeline's caretaker
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at l)incyjp"· Pam, a mile aboYe the brenk (Tr. 167) and
a~~i~ted the earPtakt~r in elosing the gates at the dam
thron<~·h "~hieh \Yater \Ya~ fh)\ving into the pipeline. He
then \\·ent on home, but returned the next morning to
the point of the break in the pipeline. A large hole was
torn in the south, or do\\·n hill side, of the pipe, and a
large rock la~- on the north shoulder of the highway (Tr.
163). He described the terrain to the north of the break
as a rather gradual 8lope to some precipitious cliffs in
the distance. ( Tr. 165). He further testified that preYious to the break the line at the point of the break was
completely covered (Tr. 175 ).
D. :JI. Grover, the caretaker at the dam, testified that
after he had shut the water off he went to the point of
the break, but it \Yas too dark to see much. He returned
the next morning·. The south side of the pipeline was
torn out, indicating the rock had hit it just over the top
(Tr. 180). A big· rock four or five feet high and six
feet long lay in the road below the break. From the
terrain it appeared that the rock had bounded down the
hill, last striking the earth before reaching the line about
sixty-eight steps north of the line. From that point it
jumped to the top of the pipeline. ( Tr. 180).
Mr. W. J. Blackburn testified that from an inspection of the cliffs above the break, and the terrain between
the cliffs and the pipeline, one could see where a portion
of the cliff had broken away, and how a large rock had
come bounding down the slope toward the pipeline,
striking the ground at points, and leaping clear of the
brush at othPrs. The distance from the break in the line
to the cliffs \\·hich had broken away was upwards of a
half mile. (Tr. 186-188)
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The witness, Roney K. Inama, described the pipeline at the point of the break as having been laid at the
base of a cut, with the face of the cut rising on the north
side of the line about twenty-five to thirty feet. The
hole in the line was on the top and south side (Tr. 212).
David A. Scott testified as to ho'v the terrain above
the break showed how the rock had come down in great
leaps and bounds from the cliffs, which he put at threefourths mile above the break, towards the pipe line. (Tr.
223)
Defendants' witnesses testified at length on other
matters, but the above is sufficient for present purposes.
Plaintiffs' contention was that defendants were negligent in not protecting the pipeline from rolling rocks;
that a rock, loosened by the frost had come rolling down
the mountainside, striking and breaking the pipe, and'
the waterflowing from the break had caused damage to
plaintiffs. The defendants' evidence supplied the details. First, the pipeline was in fact covered at the point
of the break. Second, not only was it covered, but at the
point of the break it was laid at the base of a twentyfive foot cut. So the line was adequately protected from
rolling rocks, in that it was actually covered, but _more
important it was at the base of the cut, so that rocks
rolling toward it would, upon reaching the brow of the
cut twentyfive feet above it, be carried by their own
momentum beyond the pipeline at the base of the cut.
What then is the explanation of this accident~ It
lies in the description of the terrain betwe·en the cliffs
a half to three-quarters of a mile to the north and the
line itself, as given by the witnesses. A portion of these
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cliffs broke a\vay. A large rock came do\vn the slope
from the cliffs, traYeling· in enormous leaps and bounds.
It struck the earth about 8ixty-eight steps north of the
line, lPaped hig·h in the air, and in coming down barely
clPared the bro\Y of the cut at the base of which the pipe
"-a~ laid, and in it~ descent struck the line on its southerly top side. It \Yas not an ordinary rolling rock that
broke the line. It \vas truly a phenomenon. With the
pipeline laid as it \vas at the base of the cut, the timing
of the rock had to be perfect. A little lesser or greater
momentum, and the line ,,-ould not have been hit-had
the rock last struck the earth sixty-seven or sixty-nine
paces, instead of sixty-eight, above the line, it would
have cleared.
The eventuality is not one that could reasonably
haYe been forseen, and such is the test of negligence.
The pipe line \vas amply protected from ordinary rolling rocks. If there was a duty on the part of defendants to guard against such dangers, that duty wa.s fulfilled. Accordingly, we submit, that defendants' ·motion
for directed verdict should have been granted. The
evidence of defendants established, as a matter of law,
that their duty to protect the line from forseeable hazards "ras mo1~e than fulfilled, and it was error to submit
the rna tter to the jury.
Another reason why under all the evidence a ver·dict should have been directed for defendants is to be
found in the decision of this Court in the case of Ward
v. h alt Lake (}ity, 46 Utah 616, 161 Pac. 905. As above
pointe<l out, plans and specifications for this pipeline
\\'Pre prepa1·ed by the Bureau of Reclamation of the
United States, and strictly in accord "rith best approved
1
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engineering practices. The pipeline was constructed
in accord~nce with such plans and specifications. There
is no conflict in the evidence as to these matters.
In the Ward case the question involved was whether
the defendant was negligent in its construction of a
certain gutter along a street in Salt Lake City. ()n the
part of the city it wa.s shown without conflict that the
paving, the gutters, the covering thereon and the sidewalk thereon were all constructed in accordance with
a plan prepared and recommended by a competent civil
engtneer.
In considering the question of the city's negligence
under these circumstances this co.urt said:
''It seems to us tha.t under the undisputed
evidence the verdict and judgment cannot prevail.
It has frequently been held by the courts-indeed,
so far as we are aware, there is little, if any,
diversity of opinion upon the proposition-that
a municipality may adopt and follow a plan prepared by a competent civil engineer in making
public improvements, including the paving and
guttering of streets and in constructing sidewalks
and cross-walks, and that the question of whether
such plans are sufficient or proper cannot he reviewed by the courts, except upon the grounds
pointed out by us in the case of Morris v. Salt
Lake City, 35 Utah, 485, 486, 101 Pac. 373, and
cases there cited. A municipality, as a matter of
course, is liable for a negligent execution of its
plans, or for permitting the improvements which
are constructed in accordance therewith to be out
of repair or to becomP unsafe. It may however
. ' of them'
not be sued because some citizen, or many
for that matter, may think that the public im32
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provement, although constructed according to the
plans <~doptt>d a11~.l follovved as aforesaid, are unsafe or could be improved. Where public improYement8 arp constructed in accordance with a
plan prepared and adopted as aforesaid, the city
i8 liable only in case the improvement, when con~tructed in accordance \Yi th such plan, is clearly
insufficient or unsafe.''
In the case of JV atters c. City of Oma.ha (Neb.) 110
K. \\,... 9"81, in considering- this matter the Court said :
·'In this case, as in ordinary cases grounded
on negligence, the acts or omissions of the defendant upon which the charge of negligence is based
are to be tested by the conduct of a man of
ordinary care and prudence in like circumstances.
The improvement of which the stairway in question is a part is of such a character that it could
be planned and eonstructed only by men of peculiar skill and knowledge in that line. The city
authorities, therefore, were compelled to employ
experts to plan and construct it. In doing so,
they did precisely what a man of ordinary care
and prudence would have done in like circumstances. Where·, then, is the point of departure
from the course of conduct such a man would
have pursued~ Is it in the adoption of the plan~
They had employed men skilled in their profes~ion to prepare it. Had they not a right to rely
on the superior judgment and skill of such men~
Would not a man of ordinary care and prudence
have done so in like circumstances, unless the
plan \vas so obviously defective that there could
be no difference of opinion among reasonable men
with respect to it~"
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To the same effect are the following· cases:
.Brantz v. Fargo, 19 N. D. 538, 125 N. \V. 1042,
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1169.
Town of Spencer v. Niayfield,
85 N. E. 23;

J;~

Gallagher v. City of Tipton, 1:33
W. 674;

Ind. App. 134,
~fo.

557, 113 S.

Hays v. City of Columbia, 159 Mo. 431, 141 S.
w. 3;
Rome v. Cheney, 114 Ga. 194, 39 S. E. 933, 55 L.
R. A. 221;
Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 153.
If it he said that that rule of law is applicable only
as regards construction work d0ne by the sovereign, and
we can conceive of no rational reason for such limitations,as individuals must rely upon the judgment of
expert engineers the same as governments must, nevertheless it is applicable here, because this pipeline was
constructed by the government. Defendants came into
the picture only after the project was completed. The
only issue was negligence in construction-alleged negligenee in maintenance and operation having been deleted. (Instruction No. 7, Tr. 276). Defendants can be
liable only if the United States would have been liable if
it had retained the pipeline, and under the Ward decision, supra, the United States could not have been
liable as the line was constructed under specifications
prepared and approved by competent engineers.
Still another reason why plaintiffs may not recover
in this action is to be found in the doctrine of assumed
risk. The evideuee shows tthat the line was completed
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1n 1936.

Plaintiff~'

hon1e "·cls built thereafter in 1938
or 1939 ( r~rr. ~3-l), and plaintiffs acquired it after its
con:struction ( Tr. 118). Plaintiffs knew of the existence of the pipeline. C~rr. 119) Thus the manner of
construction and complete location of the line were in
being at the time plaintiff8 acquired their prope-rty.
The. doctrine of assumed risk is succinctly stated in
38 Am. Jr. 845:
''The principle that one who voluntarily
assumed the risk of injury from a known danger
is debarred from a recovery is recognized in negligence cases. As stated, a plaintiff who, by his
conduct, has brought himself within the operation
of the maxim, 'Valenti non fit injuria,' cannot
recoYer on the basis of the defendant's negligence
In the words of the maxim as translated, 'that
to \vhich a person assents is not esteemed in law
an injury.' Although there is authority for confining the doctrine of assumption of risk to cases
arising out of the relation of master and servant,
or at least to cases involving a contract relationship, it is now fairly well settled that the defense
of assumed risk may exist independently of the
relation of master and servant. The maxim
'volenti non fit injuria' applies in a proper case
independently of any contract relation. It is
said that one \vho knows, appreciates, and deliberately exposes himself to a danger 'assumes
the risk' thereof. ''
Thus \Ye urge that plaintiffs, acquiring their property subsequ0nt to thP building of the line, with knowledg-e of its existence aud location, cannot now recover
for damages sustained by reason of said pipeline.
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One other point perhaps mel·its comment. In plaintiffs' cross examination of Mr. Iakisch it was sought
to be established that there was perhaps a safer v.ray to
construct the line than that followed, as for example,
building it of steel or concrete, instead of wood. The
evidence is undisputed that the line \Vas constructed in
accordance with best engineering practices. In fact,
except for the sugg·estion on cross-examination of 1\fr.
Iakisch that it might have been built of steel or concrete, or given a wooden snow shed covering (Tr. 155),
plaintiffs' offer no suggestions as to how the line should
have been constructed to have protected it against this
rock. Their silence is understandable, for who can suggest what precaution might have sufficed. Certainly a
rock the size of this one, dropping from above as this
one did, would have crushed any ordinary steel or concrete line as .easily as it did this wooden one. Burying
it deeper, unless it was under many feet of earth and
rock, would have been of no avail. The weight of the
rock, as it dropped from above, would have had its
effect for a considerable depth below the surface. And
if defendants must insure against damage from this
rock, must they also insure against damage by one
twice or ten times as large~ If so, they just can't lay
their lines near the mountains, because it is within the
realm of possibility that the entire side of a mountain
might some day slip away. However, the fact that there
ma.y have been a safer method is beside the point.
''If one has acted with ordinary pl'udence he
is not negligent, although danger might have been
avoided if he had acted in a different manner,
and hence, the doing of an act in a particular
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not neeessarily negligent merely beeause there may ha,Te been a safer manner of
doing it.,' ±3 C. J. 698.

mainH_\r It-'

III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GIVE TO THE JURY DEFENDANT·S' REQlTE.STED INSTRlTCTIONS NOS. 9 and 14 (ASSIGN~JEXTS OF ERROR NOS. 6 and 7)
Defendants duly and timely requested the court to
instruct the jury as follows :
·'DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
The Court charges you if you find from the evidence in this case that the rock which caused the
break in the pipeline in question herein, was a
part of a precipice or cliff which existed prior to
said break and was approximately from one-half
of a mile to a mile distant from said pipeline, then
the Court charges you that the defendants were
not required to anticipate that such rock would
be so broken from said precipice or cliff, and
therefore the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
recover in this action." (Tr. 268)
"DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 14.
rrhe court charges you that if you find from the
evidence in this case that the water that flowed
down onto the road from the break in the pipeline in question, \vould have flowed into the river
but for the fact that the State Road Commission
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had prevented the water from so flowing into
the ri·-v'er by placing an embankment of sno\\' on
either side of the roadway, which caused the
water to flo"r dovvn the road ,,·ay on to plaintiffs'
premises, then you must find for the defendant~
no cause for action." (Tr. 269-)
The lower court refused to give each of such requested instructions, and such refusal is assigned as
error.
(a) As to

defendant~'

requested instruction No. 9.

The evidence in the case, and as hereinbefore outlined, established that the rock which broke the pipeline
broke from a cliff upwards of a half mile north of the
line. The location of the cliffs from which this rock
came, in relation to the line, is further evidenced by
the photographs received in evidence as exhibits. It
is defendants' contention that the care required of them
was not such as a matter of law as would require them
to forsee the likelihood of a rock falling from this cliff
reaching and damaging the line. Hence, the defendants
were entitled to such instruction, and the lower court
erred in refusing it.
(b) As to defendants' requested instruction No. 14.
The pipeline at the point at which it was damaged
lies a few feet north of the highway, and at a higher
elevation. Plaintiffs' home was located down the winding canyon road about three-fourths mile from the point
of the break. ( Tr. 193) Ogden River parallels the highway down the canyon, and at the point of the break it
is immediately south of the highway. There are several
points along the highway between the point of the break
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and plaintiff::;' h<nne at ~which \Vater on the highway will
fhnY therefrom and into the river if unimpeded. One of
such point~ is about 75 to 100 feet down the highway
from the point of the break. ( Tr. 193-196) In other
''?ords, the \Vater flo\ved from the break onto the high\Yay, and then flo\ved do\vn the highway. Under normal
conditions it \Vould have flowed from the highway and
into the river long before it reached plaintiffs' property,
probably within 75 to 100 feet from the point at which
it reached the highway. Prior to the time of the break,
ho\YeYer, the State Hig·h,vay Commission, in its :maintenance of this highway had plowed the snow therefrom
and into banks on either side which were from two and
a half to three feet hig·h, and which banks of snow had
become frozen. The effect thereof was to form a channel
of the highway from which the water could not escape
as it flowed down the highway toward plaintiffs' property. Tr. 193-198; 205; 232; Exhibit 17; 233)~
Defendants' contention is that had it not been for
the action of the highway maintenance crews banking
the snow along the highway as they did and in such a
way as to prevent the normal flow of water from the
highway into the river, the water flowing from the
break would not have reached plaintiffs' property threefourths mile a\vay, but would have flowed into the river
long before it reached plaintiffs' property. That in view
of this fact any negligence of defendants in the premises
was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage, and
the Court should have so instructed the jury.
A terse and clear statement of what in law constitute:::; proximate cause was made by this Court in the
case of Rollo~w c. Ogde'n City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791.
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'~The

1n·oxin1ate cause of an injury is the
primary moving cause without which it would not
have been inflicted, but which, in the natural and
probable sequence of events, a11d U'ithout tlle in.terventio·n of any ·J·t.,~w or iJirl epende1lt ca.use, produces the injury.''
Apply that definition of proximate cause to this
case. For the water flowing from the break in defendants pipeline to be the proximate cause of plaintiffs'
damage the circumstances must be, first, that "in the
natural and probable sequence of events'' it would have
produced the damage, and second, production of the
damage must be ''without the intervention of any new
or independent cause.''
In this case the evidence 1s without conflict that
"in the natural and probable sequence of events" any
large amount of \vater flowing from the break would
have passed into the river long before reaching plaintiffs·' property and without damage to plaintiffs. The
reason it didn't go into the river, in the natural sequence
of events, is because highway maintenance crews prevented it from so doing, and actually channelled it down
the highway a distance of some three quarters of a mile
to a point where it flowed onto plaintiffs' property.
There was thus the intervention of a .''new or irl:dependent cause'', without \vhich damages to plaintiff would
not have resulted.
We submit that the defendants were entitled to
their requested instruction No. 14, and the lower court
erred in not giving it.
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IV.
1,HE I_.jOWER l'iOl'RT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIOXS 1, 3, 9, 10 and 1:2. (ASSIGNJ\tiENTS OF ER,ROR
8 TO 25).
(a)

AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 1

By its instruction No. 1 the lower court sought to
outline to the jury the claims of the parties as embodied
in the pleading·s. In its recitals as to plaintiffs' contentions the court stated that it was contended by plaintiffs that ''defendants carelessly and negligently left the
said pipe lying unprotected upon the surface of the
ground. ' ' ( Tr. 273) There is no evidence in the case
that the pipeline was either unprotected or lying upon
the surface of the ground, and on the contrary the evidence 'Yas not controverted that the pipeline was protected by the cut, at the base of which it was laid, and
further '-ras covered by at least six inches of earth.
While it is true that the foregoing was stated only
as a contention on the part of plaintiffs, we submit that
it is improper to advise the jury as to claims made in
the pleadings, in support of which no evidence is offered,
unless the jury is further instructed that no proof thereof has been made, as it tends to mislead the jury into
believing that there is evidence in the case in support
of such contention. In other words, in advising the jury
a~ to the claims of the parties, only such claims should
be stated in support of which competent evidence has
been received.
The court further, as a part of its instruction No. 1,
stated:
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"The defendants and each of them \\?ell kne\\',
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that in the spring of every year rocks being
loosened on the melting of the frost roll do,vn the
sides of said mountains and across the place 'vhere
the defendants laid and maintained said pipe
without protecting· the same from said rocks and
boulders.''
Defendants duly excepted to this portion of the instruction (Tr. 284).
The court doesn't preface its assertion by any positive statement that this too is but a claim of the plaintiffs, but throws it in as an established fact, which we
submit was error, as it was a controverted issue in the
cause.
Nor do we believe that the final paragraph of the
instruction cures the error, as it relates only to "allegations and denials'' of the parties, and, as indica ted, this
portion of the instructions was not given as being merely
an allegation of the plaintiffs.
·
(b)

AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 5.
The court's instruction No. 5 reads as follows:

"The 'proximate cause' of an injury is that
cause which,-in a nat.ural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause,
-the one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate ·directly or by putting intervening agencies
in motion." (Tr. 275)
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Defendants duly excepted to the whole of the in8truction, and separately to the sec.ond sentence thereof.
( Tr. j85) 8uch 8econd sentence, we submit, is not
a correet 8tatement of the la\Y, and as it tends to modify
the first sentence, the instruction is had and it was error
for the c.ourt to give it.
The effect of the instruction as given 1s to define
proximate cause as being· merely
'• the efficient ea use,-the one that necessarily
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury''.
Under the definition of proximate cause given by
this court in Rollow v. Ogden City, supra, proximate
cause is not simply the ''efficient cause'', as given by
the lo\Yer court, but the ''efficient cause'', if one wants
to use that phrase, which, in the natural and probable

sequence of events produces the injury, w·ithout the intervention of any new or independent cause. Those
limitations on "efficient cause", which limitations are
essential to proximate cause, were wholly lacking or
nullified by the instruction as given.
(c)

AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
The instruction as given reads as follows:

'• Water eollected by gravitation manifests a
power familiar to all, capable of accomplishing
useful and beneficial purposes, or destructive and
disastrous consequences and results.
If thP defendants in this action interfered
\\'ith or undertook to control the force of the water
flo,ving dcnvn ()gden Canyon, for their own purposes, by the diversion of that water into a
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wooden pipe constructed along the side of the
.canyon and above the land, home and other property of the plaintiffs, Mr. and l\Irs. Knight, the
law requires the defendants :::;o doing to use ordinary judgment, skill, care and caution in the construction of that pipe line and in the use of the
pipe line for the coursing of \vater in order that
the property of the plaintiffs may not be injured.
In so constructing, and using the said wooden
pipe line to conduct and control that water, they
are required to anticipate and prepare to meet
such emergencies as may reasonably he expected
to arise in the course .of nature, although they
are not required to prepare to meet unlooked
for and overwhelming displays of adverse power
of such a nature as to surprise cautious and
reasonable men in the same circumstances." (Tr.
276)
Defendants duly excepted to the whole thereof, and
separately as to each paragraph (Tr. 285, 286).
The first paragraph of the instruction is obviously
a purely gratuitous theoretical observation of the court
which, we submit, embodies no statment of law, and
which has no place in instructions of law. We feel it
was error for the court to make this purely gratuitous
observation.
The second paragTaph is devastating. By its instruction No. 7 the court instructed the jury that negligence in construction 'vas the only issue in the case,
and negligence in maintenance is out, and then immediately follows with its instruction No. 9 in which the jury
is instructed as to defendants' duty in their use of the
line.
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(d)

~A.S

TO INSTRt:CTION NO. 10.

rr hi~ iu~truetion as g·iven is as follows:
· •If the defendants constructed the wooden
pipeline referred to in the evidence in this case
or conYeyed \Yaters through the same for their
O\\'U purposes, the defendants were under a duty
to u~e the same care which an ordinary prudent
man \vould use in the construction and operation
of the pipeline to prevent the escape of water
from the pipe to the damage of those in the
Yicinity. The degree of care required to prevent
the escape of water is commensurate with the
damag·e or injury that will probably result if the
\Yater does not escape. In this case if a reasonable prudent man \Yould anticipate that the damage \vhich would probably result in the water
should escape from the pipeline here involved
would be high, then the degree of care required
to prevent the escape of water from this pipeline
would be high. If on the other hand a reasonable
prudent man in the same or similar circumstances
would anticipate that the damage which would
probably result from the escape of the water in
the pipeline would be only small or slight, then
the degree of care required would be correspondingly low. If you find from a preponderance of
all of the eYidence in this case that the defendants,
in the construction of the pipeline in this case,
failed to exercise that degree of care to prevent
the escape of water from the pipeline which an
ordinary prudent man in the same or similar
circumstances \vould exercise in the protection
of said pipeline from rocks rolling down the canyon hillside, that could reasonably be anticipated to roll down the canyon hillside,
and that as the natural and proximate
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result of their neglect to exBrcise that care
water escaped from the pipeline and caused damage and injury to the property of the plaintiff:-;,
then you should find for the plaintiffs and assess
their damag·es in such amount as you find to be
reasonable under the evidence and the other instructions of the court. (Tr. "277)
Defendants duly excepted thereto, and separately as
to each of the first three sentences thereof and the last
sentence. (Tr. 287) We find the same error as in Instruction No. 9. The court, having taken negligence in
maintenance from the jury by Instruction No. 9, has
again given it back, for the court says:
''the defendants were under a duty to use
the same care which an ordinary prudent man
woud use in the construction and operation of
the pipeline to prevent the escape of water from
the pipe to the damage of those in the vicinity.''
(Tr. 277)
(e)

AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

By subparagraphs (c) and (h) and subparasgraph (f) and (j) the court instructed the jury that if
they found for the plaintiffs they might award them-:
" (c) Such sum as will reasonably compensate said plaintiffs for damage to their clothing,
but not to exceed the sum of $375, the amount
clainv;;d by plaintiffs.
(h) Such sum as will reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable repair actually
needed of r1othing of the parties \Yhich they were
able to salvage, but not to exceed the sum of $50,
the amount claimed by. plaintiffs.
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(f) Such sum as \rill reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable expenditure
made by them and \Yhich \vas actually necessary
for removing· the ~aid mud and silt from their
d\Yelling house and cleaning the same, and cleaning and polishing of said furniture, and cleaning·
drift and debris from the yard, and cleaning the
garage, and re-dig·ging and repairing the cesspool, and repairing doors and furniture damaged
by \Vater, and cleaning and repairing the fire
place in the said d\velling, but not to exceed the
sum of $300, the amount claimed by the plaintiffs.
(j) Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate
said plaintiffs for the reasonable damage beyond
repair of the furniture, but not to exceed the sum
of $1~5, the amount claimed by plaintiffs.'' (Tr.
:279)
Exceptions to these portions of such instruction
\vere duly taken. (Tr. 279) It is apparent that by subparagraphs (c) and (h) the court instructed the jury
that it might award twice for the same damages referred
to in such instructions. The same is true as to subparagraphs (f) and ( j). This clearly was error.
CONCLUSION
Defendants accordingly submit that the lower court
erred
(1)

in over-ruling defendants' demurrers;

(2)

in denying defendants' motions for non-suits;

( 3) in denying defendants' motions for a directed
verdict;
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( 4) in refusing to give defendants' requested instructions in the particulars hereinbefore noted.
( 5) in instructing the jury as it did in the particulars noted ..
That such errors were substantial and prejudicial
to defendants, and each of them, and the judgment of the
lower eourt should he reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES L. OvARD,
HowELL,

STINE AND

OLMSTEAD,

Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Power & Light Company

K. HoLTHER
Attorney for Defendant

DAVID

Ogden River Water Users
Association.
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